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HONEY, I'M HOME:
ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF OFFICER
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
JACQUELINE M. MAZZOLA*
INTRODUCTION

"Kristin--don't worry. We're all over this. We were on it as soon as you
called."1 This was not the first time a supervisor at the Utica Police
Department reassured Kristin. 2 Kristin received this response sometime in
the late summer of 2009.3 A few weeks later, on September 28, Kristin's
eight-year-old son returned home from school, walked into his home, and
found his mother dead and his father near death. 4 Joseph A. Longo, a
thirteen-year veteran of the Utica Police Department, had taken a kitchen
knife and brutally stabbed Kristin thirteen times in her back and upper
chest, killing her and then turning the knife on himself.5
Kristin suffered extensive verbal, physical, and mental abuse by Longo
throughout their marriage. 6 Longo also physically, verbally, and
emotionally abused his four children. 7 On August 13, 2009, Longo stood in
front of his children and wife, held his service revolver, and told them,
"[t]oday is the day I go postal on all of you." 8 Before this incident,
supervisors at the Utica Police Department discouraged Kristin from
seeking an order of protection against Longo and from reporting anything
serious to the police because Longo could be suspended or he could lose
* Assistant Law Clerk for Hon. Rudolph E. Greco, Jr., New York Supreme Court, Queens County; J.D.,
St. John's University School of Law, 2013; B.B.A., summa cum laude, Loyola University Maryland,
2010.
1 Pearce v. Estate of Longo, 766 F. Supp. 2d 367, 372 (N.D.N.Y. 2011).

2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 373; Rocco LaDuca, Attorney: Longo's Wife FearedFor Her Safety, OBSERVER-DISPATCH
(Sept. 29, 2009), http://www.uticaod.com/news/x576527296/Officials-Longo-s-wife-filed-divorcepapers-before-stabbing.
5 Pearce, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 373; LaDuca, supra note 4.
6 Pearce, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 372.
7 Id; LaDuca, supranote 4.
8 Pearce,766 F. Supp. 2d at 372.
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his job. 9 One day after this incident, Kristin reported what had happened to
the Utica Police Department and told the supervisor that she feared for her
life and her children's lives.' 0 She also notified Longo's supervisor that
Longo was emotionally unstable and needed counseling. "1The supervisor's
response was, "I know he is not ok."12
While Longo's supervisors did meet with Longo shortly after this
incident, it was to no avail. 1 3 The same day as that meeting, Longo returned
home while still on police duty with his service revolver and forced Kristin
to flee her own home. 14 Once again, she reported this incident, and Longo's
supervisor reassured her that Longo's gun would be confiscated. 15
However, the gun was not confiscated.1 6
On September 14, 2009, in front of his youngest child and Kristin,
Longo put the barrel of his service revolver in his mouth and threatened
again to kill himself.17 Kristin relayed her fears to Longo's supervisor, who
in turn reassured her that the police department was aware of the situation
and would protect her and her children. 18 Longo was disciplined, however
it was for an unrelated incident where he pointed his gun at a woman while
working as a high school security guard.19 Fellow officers were concerned
about Longo's behavior, and one officer even urged the police chief to
confiscate Longo's weapons.2 0 Contrarily, the police chief, who was one of
Longo's close friends and Longo's ex-partner, affirmatively ordered Longo
to keep his weapons and remain on duty. 2 1 One of the chiefs subordinates
overrode the chiefs order and took away Longo's weapons. 22 On
September 28, 2009, Kristin and Longo were in court together for their
divorce.2 3 Kristin was awarded exclusive possession of the family home. 24

9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Pearce,776 F. Supp. 2d at 372.
15 Id.
16 See id. at 372-73 (inferring that it was not confiscated because he had the service revolver
subsequently on September 14, 2009).
17 Id. at 372.
18 Id. at 373.
19 Id.
20 Pearce,776 F. Supp. 2d at 373.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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Less than four hours later, Kristin was found dead in that home. 2 5
This Note focuses on the particular problem of officer domestic violence.
With officer domestic violence, victims face special obstacles in seeking
help because the abuser is part of the system set up to end the abuse. As
such, the abuser is issued and trained in how to use weapons and restraints,
and the abuser has access to information that the general public does not.
New York State police departments should adopt new policies regarding
officer domestic violence because officer domestic violence is a prevalent
problem, victims are underrepresented and face obstacles in obtaining
necessary help, and precincts must be held accountable for failing to
respond adequately to officer domestic violence. This Note urges New
York to pass new legislation that would require police precincts to adopt
specific procedures that must be followed when there are allegations of
officer domestic violence.
This Note is divided into four main parts. Part I of this Note will discuss
the prevalence and the problem of officer domestic violence. This part will
also focus on the special problems those victims of officer domestic
violence face. Part II of this Note will explore the current laws and policies
that already govern officer domestic violence, and will address the
obstacles that a victim or a victim's family may face when suing an officer
or an entire police precinct for police misconduct. Part III of this Note will
explore the self-help option for victims. Part IV of this Note will propose
the adoption of legislation requiring New York police departments to
institute policies addressing officer domestic violence.
I. OFFICER DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

This part will explore the problem of officer domestic violence. Section
A will discuss the prevalence of officer domestic violence. Section A will
also explore factors that may contribute to officers becoming domestic
violence abusers, and will explain the special obstacles that victims of
officer domestic violence must face. Section B will discuss the "code of
silence" and the problem of underreporting, especially in police families.
A. Double the Troublefor Victims of Officer Domestic Violence
Domestic violence crosses all socioeconomic classifications and
26
professions, including doctors, lawyers, and even police officers.
25 Id.; LaDuca, supra note 4.
26 SHIHO YAMAMOTO & HARVEY WALLACE, Domestic Violence By Law Enforcement Officers, in
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However, victims of officer domestic violence face numerous dangers that
victims in the general population do not face. 2 7 For example, "[f]ear
dominates a victim of domestic violence; when the abuser is a police
officer, that fear is compounded." 28 Officer abusers are tougher and more
dangerous, and "[t]hey have training, a badge, a gun and the weight of the
police culture behind them." 29 In fact, domestic violence in police officer
families may be as much as four times as prevalent when compared to the
ten percent of families in the general population who experience domestic
violence. 30 Even assuming that domestic violence occurs in police families
at the same rate as it does in the general population, approximately 60,000
to 180,000 police families are affected. 3 1
Officer domestic violence is not only devastating for the direct victims of
the abuse, but it also has an indirect devastating effect on the entire
community. Domestic violence by just one officer questions the credibility
and effectiveness of the entire police precinct. 32 If officers are supposed to
protect the community and stop acts of domestic violence, officers must
first respond to the domestic violence present within the precinct. 33 If an
officer is not responding to domestic violence within the precinct, that
officer's ability to perform his police duties may be compromised because
that officer may be unable to think rationally on the scene. 34 For example,
if an officer abuser goes on a domestic violence call, he may not adequately
protect the victim for various reasons; he may think that she is lying, or he
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 255 (Nicky Ali Jackson ed., 2007) [hereinafter Encyclopedia];
Suzanne Laurent, Domestic Violence Crosses All Socioeconomic Lines, DERRYNEWS.COM (Nov. 5,
2009),
http://www.denynews.com/locai/x546140143/Domestic-violence-crosses-all-socioeconomiclines/print.
27 Encyclopedia, supra note 26, at 256.
28 Maureen O'Hagan & Cheryl Phillips, The Brame Case: When a wife's abuser is a cop, who can
help?,

THE

SEATTLE

TIMES

(May

9,

2003),

http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date-20030509&slug--dv9m0.
29 Diane Wetendorf, The Impact of Police-Perpetrated Domestic Violence 2 (2000),
http://www.dwetendorf.com/Wetendorf hnpactPoliceDVFBI.pdf [hereinafter Impact].
30 See Encyclopedia, supra note 26, at 255-56 (stating that one study found approximately 40%,
but noting that no agreement on the prevalence rate of domestic violence by officers exists); see also
Police Family Violence Fact Sheet, NATIONAL CENTER FOR WOMEN & POLICING (2005),
http://www.womenandpolicing.org/violenceFS.asp (finding that at least 40% of police officer families
experience domestic violence).
31

ELLEN KIRSCHMAN,I LOVE A COP: WHAT POLICE FAMILIES NEED TO KNOW 164 (2007).

32 Karen J. Kruger & Nicholas G. Valltos, Dealing with Domestic Violence in Law Enforcement
Relationships, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, July 2002, at 1, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/artices/mi-m2l94/is-7-71/ai-89973552/?tag--content;colll;
Gina
Barton,
Police Department Ignores National Standards for Officers Accused of Domestic Violence,
JSONLINE.COM (Oct. 30, 2011), http://www.j sonline.com/watchdog/watchdogreports/police-departmentignores-national-standards-for-officers-accused-of-domestic-violence- 132868198.html.
33 See Kruger,supra note 32, at I.
34 See id at 4.
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may believe that the restraining order should not be enforced. 3 5 Also, if the
officer abuser is called to testify in a case of domestic violence, that
testimony may be filled with personal bias. 36
The discrepancy between the number of families in the general
population affected by domestic violence and the number of police families
affected by domestic violence may be attributed to the very nature of being
a police officer. 37 When some civilians become police officers, they change
and develop a "command presence." 38 At work, officers need to be in
control. 39 They give and take orders daily. 40 When these orders are not
complied with, officers are taught to use physical force and verbal
intimidation.4 1 Officers are issued handguns, batons, and handcuffs and
receive special training on how to use these, and their own fists, as
weapons. Officers are also trained to use certain techniques to incapacitate
someone.4 2 Most injuries caused by these techniques are not easily
observable. 43 These same control tactics are often incorporated into an
officer's home life. For example, officer abusers know how and where to
hit a domestic violence victim so that bruises are not visible. 44 Thus, when
a victim complains of injury, she often will not have any physical evidence
5
of injury to support her claim. 4
Officers also have privileges that civilians do not have. For example,
officers can legitimately access records of confidential and personal
information.46 Officers have access to information including locations of
shelters and community support groups, and officers receive training in
surveillance and investigation.4 7 Officers can use these privileges for
35 See Impact of Police-PerpetratedDomestic Violence in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY POLICE
available
at
(Donald
C.
Sheehan
ed.,
2000),
OFFICERS
375,
381
see also Leigh Goodmark,
http://www.dwetendorf.comIWetendorf ImpactPoliceDV FBI.pdf;
Symposium, Ethics of Family Representation: Going Underground: The Ethics of Advising a Battered
Woman Fleeing an Abusive Relationship, 75 UMKC L. REV. 999, 1014 (2007) (questioning whether
police officers would enforce a court order against a fellow officer who committed domestic violence).
36 See Impact, supranote 29, at 381-82.
37 See KIRSCHMAN,supra note 31, at 164.
38 See DIANE WETENDORF, WHEN THE BATTERER IS A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER: A GUIDE FOR
(Feb.
2004),
WOMEN'S
JUSTICE
PROJECT
14
ADVOCATES,
BATTERED

http://www.bwjp.org/files/bwjp/articles/Batterer LE Advocate_Guide2009.pdf [hereinafter Guide].
39 See KIRSCHMAN, supra note 31, at 165.
40 Id.
41

Id

42
43
44
45
46
47

Guide, supra note 38, at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id; O'Hagan & Phillips, supranote 28.
Guide, supra note 38.
Encyclopedia,supranote 26, at 256.
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personal reasons, such as tracking the victim and identifying any visitors
the victim may have over, including fellow officers who may stop by to
take a statement, therapists who are needed to develop safety plans with the
victim, and lawyers who may visit with the victim to discuss divorce or
other legal courses of actions. 48 Thus, hiding from an officer is nearly
impossible. 49 Advocates from a battered women's shelter state that when a
victim of officer domestic violence seeks help, "[i]t's a frightening feeling,
even for the domestic violence advocates. That's because officers know the
locations of confidential shelters, or can easily fird out, posing a risk to
everyone." 50
B. Hush Hush: The Code of Silence and Underreporting
The "code of silence" that pervades police precincts is another
significant factor that contributes to the higher incidents of domestic
violence seen in police families. 51 The code of silence "is an unofficial
acknowledgment that no officer blames or implicates another officer who is
accused of a wrongdoing." 52 The code of silence severely limits a victim's
access to helpful networks. Because officers face daily life-or-death
situations together, a culture of solidarity and loyalty is fostered among the
54
officers. 53 This solidarity leads to the unspoken code of silence.
The officers that maintain a conspiracy of silence may persuade the
victim that the loss of her abuser's job would devastate her family. 55
Officers may also fear that they will be ostracized or will be abandoned by
other officers if they break this code of silence. 56 As a result, at trial some
officers may cover up for another officer and may commit perjury instead
of telling the truth about a fellow officer. 57 The code of silence applies to
all wrongdoings, including domestic violence allegations and may be "the
greatest single barrier to the effective investigation and adjudication of

48 Guide, supra note 38.
49 Encyclopedia, supranote 26, at 257.
50 Guide, supra note 38, at 28 (internal quotation marks omitted).
51 Karen Oehme et al., Protecting Lives, Careers, and Public Confidence: Florida's Efforts to
Prevent Officer-Involved Domestic Violence, 49 FAM. CT.REv. 84, 85 (2011).
52 Encyclopedia, supranote 26, at 258.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 LAURENCE MILLER, PRACTICAL POLICE PSYCHOLOGY: STRESS MANAGEMENT

AND CRISIS

INTERVENTION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 273 (2006).
56 MILLER, supra note 55, at 273.
57 Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 US.C. § 1983 Is Ineffective in Deterring
Police Brutality,44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 763 (1993).
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58
complaints against police officers."
This "code of silence" may even extend beyond the police precinct
because officers work with and form relationships with members of the
criminal justice system, such as dispatchers, victim advocates, fellow
officers, attorneys, judges, and corrections personnel. 5 9 Officers can exploit
these relationships to manipulate the system. 60 This exploitation in turn
severely limits the victim's ability to seek help. This close relationship with
other professionals may also leave a victim, or a victim's family, weary of
proceeding against an officer abuser because a victim may fear that the
officer has special insight into how the criminal justice system works. 6 1 As
one survivor put it, "I knew they'd cover up for him like they did for each
other." 62 Not only does a victim fear that if she presses charges against the
officer abuser those charges will be dropped, but a victim also fears that the
officer will find a way to fabricate charges against her.63 For example, a
victim may fear that the officer may plant drugs or stolen property on her,
or even worse, "she may know that he is capable of rigging her car to cause
'64
an auto 'accident' or running her off the road."
Compounding all of these factors is yet another obstacle: victims of
officer domestic violence are not only unlikely to receive help, but are also
unlikely to report domestic violence. Between 1998 and 2002,
approximately sixty percent of domestic violence in the general population
was reported to the police. 65 The most common reason victims of domestic
violence cited for not reporting the abuse was that the incident was a
"private/personal matter." 6 6 Another reason for the non-reporting was to
"protect the offender." 67 For victims of officer domestic violence, this fear
is even greater because in order to report an incident of domestic violence,
the victim would have to open up to her abuser's colleagues. Those who do
report incidents of officer domestic violence have seen very few results
because the abusers were supported by a system that gave the officer

58 John Joseph Powers, Jr., Eroding the Blue Wall of Silence: The Need for an Internal Affairs
Privilegeof Confidentiality,5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 19,27 (2000).
59 Guide, supranote38, at 17-18.
60 Encyclopedia,supranote 26, at 256; Guide, supranote 38, at 17-18.
61 Encyclopedia, supra note 26, at 256-57 (suggesting that officers also know which judges are
hard and which are lenient regarding domestic violence cases and when to ask for continuances because
courts are busy).
62 KIRSCHMAN, supra note 31, at 160.
63 Guide, supranote 38, at 18.
64 Id.
65 D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMmY LAW 305 (4th ed. 2010).

66 Id.
67 Id.
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abusers more credibility than the victims, that failed to fully investigate
officer domestic violence allegations, and that may have even supported the
officer abusers. 68 Thus, there is a hushing effect on both sides - the
reporting of the abuse and the following through with an allegation against
a fellow officer.
II. INADEQUACIES OF CURRENT LAWS AND POLICIES
This part will explore whether the law can address the special challenges
posed by officer domestic violence. This part will discuss the current laws
and policies that have an effect on officer domestic violence. Section A will
explain the current policies that are aimed at encouraging police precincts
to curb officer domestic violence. Section B will discuss the ways in which
victims, or families of victims, can turn to the judicial system for
compensation when a police officer, or an entire police precinct, fails to
protect a victim of officer domestic violence.
A. Policies and Laws Aimed at Preventing Officer Domestic Violence
In 2003, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)
updated its model policy on officer domestic violence.69 This model policy
advises precincts to reach out to spouses of officers periodically and to take
a zero-tolerance stance regarding domestic violence. 70 This policy calls for
the training of all officers in domestic violence issues.7 1 Disappointingly, in
2006, three years after the updated policy was issued, a random sample of
one hundred large agencies found that fewer than twenty-nine percent of
these agencies had an officer domestic violence policy.72 While some
departments encourage spouses to come forward, 73 this is simply not

enough.
Instead, in many precincts an internal affairs division investigates citizen
complaints about an officer, including domestic violence allegations. 74
However, an internal investigation may actually put the victim at further
risk. 75 The problem with an internal affairs investigation is that the internal
68
69
70
71

O'Hagan & Phillips, supranote 28; Oehme et al., supra note 51, at 85.
Guide, supra note 38, at 20.

Id.
JOHN S. DEMPSEY & LINDA S. FORST, AN INTRODUCTION TO POLICING 224 (2008).

72 Id.

73 Guide, supra note 38, at 20.
74 Patton, supranote 57, at 787.
75 See Guide, supra note 38, at 22 (noting "an internal investigation is extremely threatening to an
officer and is a dangerous period for the victim" because the chief cannot keep the investigation
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affairs departments are located within the police precincts, and the
76
investigations, except the final outcome, are hidden from the public.
Thus, the code of silence may also have an effect on an internal affairs
investigation because the camaraderie and loyalty to officers may lead to
biased and untruthful findings. 77 Even if the internal affairs department
decided that there had been problematic officer domestic violence, the
78
decision to discipline the officer abuser rests with the chief in most cases.
If the chief refuses to punish an officer abuser, as the chief of the Utica
Police Department did regarding Officer Longo, this sends a message that
79
the chief agrees with the officer's domestic violence conduct.
The federal government has also become involved by developing a
federal prohibition on firearms. Passed in 1996, the Lautenberg
Amendment prohibits any individual who is convicted of domestic violence
from owning a gun. 80 Specifically, this law prohibits any officer from
possessing a gun if that officer is convicted of a domestic violence
misdemeanor. 8 1 While this law is laudable on paper, as discussed earlier
many allegations of officer abuse are handled informally, many allegations
are plea-bargained into noncriminal dispositions, and many precincts do
not maintain records of these incidents, making it hard to get a conviction
against an officer abuser. 82 The Lautenberg Amendment did block over
150,000 attempted gun purchases by abusers convicted of domestic
violence crimes during the first ten years of its enactment. 83 On the other
hand, the Lautenberg Amendment may only increase a victim's fear to
report an officer domestic violence incident. 84 If the officer loses his gun
under the Lautenberg Amendment, he will most likely lose his job, unless

confidential from the entire precinct).
76 Patton, supranote 57, at 787.
77 Id. at 791; Oehme et al., supra note 51, at 85.
78 Patton, supranote 57, at 792.
79 See id. at 792 (finding that the chief has an enormous role in setting the overall tone of the
precinct).
80 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012).
81 Encyclopedia,supra note 26, at 258.
82 See, e.g., Encyclopedia, supra note 26, at 258-59 (finding that between 1990 and 1997, there
were 227 alleged cases of domestic violence by officers in the Los Angeles Police Department, but only
four of these allegations resulted in a conviction of criminal charges. Of the four, one officer was
suspended for fifteen days and another officer's conviction was expunged).
83 SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE GUN BAN TEN YEARS LATER:
at
3,
available
2,
DENIED
ABUSERS
SAVED,
LIVES

http://lautenberg.senate.gov/documents/domestic/THE%20DOMESTIC%2VIOLENCE%20GUN%20
BAN.pdf.
84 Eileen K. McCluskey, Police Who Hit, 7 NO. 3 QUINLAN, POLICE DEP'T DISCIPLINARY BULL.
ART. 2 (Mar. 1999).
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he can find a desk job.85 This fear, that the officer will almost certainly lose
his job if he is found guilty of domestic violence, may actually lead to a
decrease in the number of reports of officer domestic violence.8 6
B. Police Failedto Protect:Now What?
This section will explain the current legal remedies that exist if the
police do nothing to protect victims or if the police exacerbate a situation.
This section will discuss the difficulty in establishing the elements
necessary to sustain a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Then, this section will move
on to discuss the potential for maintaining a suit under New York State tort
law. Lastly, this section will conclude that even if an action is sustained,
the behavior and attitudes present in the police precinct may not change,
and thus officer domestic violence will not be deterred.
To begin, separation-of-powers principles assert that police officers
should be free to exercise their discretion without courts interfering with
their decision-making abilities. 8 7 For this reason, courts do not like to hold
the state accountable for an officer's action or inaction. 88 In other words,
courts and society generally believe that police officers should not have to
second-guess their decisions out of fear that they may be sued for that
decision. 89
Yet, many families of victims of police violence, like Kristin's family,
will sue police precincts for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
This statute creates no substantive rights. 90 Rather, it provides a remedy for
a deprivation of a right that is already established in the Constitution. Thus,
to prevail on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must show a deprivation of a
constitutional right.9 1 State liability does not extend beyond the boundaries
of the substantive constitutional rights that were deprived. 92 Generally, no

right to police protection exists for private acts of violence, and police

85 Id.
86 Id; see generally Jennifer Ammons, Batterers with Badges: Officer-Involved Domestic
Violence, 29 WOMEN LAW. J. 29 (2005).
87 Valdez v. City of N.Y., 960 N.E.2d 356, 361-62 (N.Y. 2011); Galka v. Cooper, No. 11-13089,
2012 WL 4341059, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 2012).
88 G. Kristian Miccio, Exiled from the Province of Care: Domestic Violence, Duty and
Conceptions ofState Accountability, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 111, 190 (2005).
89 Denis v. Town of Haverstraw, 852 F. Supp. 2d 405, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Valdez, 960 N.E.2d at
361-62.
90 Susanna M. Kim, Section 1983 Liability in the Public Schools After DeShaney: The "Special
Relationship" Between School andStudent, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1106 (1994).
91 WEISBERG & APPLETON, supranote 65, at 321.
92 Kim, supra note 90, at 1106.
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inaction has not been read to mean a deprivation of a right.93 Courts have
been unwilling to impose upon states widespread duties to affirmatively act
94
on behalf of an individual.
§ 1983 claims also have a high threshold standard of liability. 95 Even if a
court recognizes an affirmative duty to protect a particular plaintiff's
constitutional interest, the state will not be found liable "unless the plaintiff
can show that the government was at least reckless or deliberately
indifferent to the plaintiffs constitutional rights." 96 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has limited the scope of § 1983 claims by refusing to
impose a duty upon the state to protect an individual unless a "special
relationship" exists between that state and that individual. 97 A "special
relationship" is recognized "when the state incarcerates or institutionalizes
individuals, because the state has taken custody of the individuals and
rendered them incapable of controlling their environment and protecting
themselves." 98
This special relationship doctrine was examined in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services,99 where the mother of
an abused child sued the state of Wisconsin alleging that the state welfare
officers failed to protect her child from repeated beatings by the child's
father. 100 The mother claimed that this failure to protect breached her
child's constitutionally protected due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 101 The Supreme Court found that the Due Process Clause
conferred "no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid
may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the
government itself may not deprive the individual." 0 2 The Supreme Court
held that Wisconsin's failure to protect against a private act of violence did
not violate the Due Process Clause.l 0 3 However, if the state officers had
acted to protect the child and had failed to protect, then the child's due
process rights would have been violated. 104 This distinction can be stated as
93 WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 65, at 321.

94
90, at
95
96
97

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989); Kim, supra note
1107.
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); Kim, supra note 90, at 1107.
Kim, supra note 90, at 1107.
Id.at 1108.

98 Id.

99 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
100 Id. at 191.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 196.
103 Id. at 197.
104

VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ FT AL., PROSSER, WADE, AND SCuWARTZ'S TORTS

440 (12th ed. 2010).
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"'whether the state is the doer of harm rather than merely an inept
rescuer."' 105 Therefore, the special relationship doctrine is only invoked
when "the state assumes custody of a person" and thus, "owes him a
rudimentary duty of safekeeping no matter how perilous his circumstances
when he was free." 1 06
Absent a special relationship, the state has no constitutional duty to
protect citizens against deprivations of life, liberty, or property committed
by individuals.10 7 Hence, domestic violence victims are restricted to
bringing procedural, rather than substantive, due process claims. 108 In most
cases where plaintiffs have claimed that their procedural due process rights
were violated, the relevant state law provides for mandatory enforcement of
legally issued restraining orders. 109
However, in 2005 the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the possibility
of sustaining a procedural due process violation in a domestic violence
case. In Castle Rock v. Gonzales,]10 the plaintiff, a domestic violence
victim, sued the state under § 1983.111 The Supreme Court held that the
wrongful failure by the police to arrest her husband, who had violated a
restraining order, did not amount to a violation of a constitutional due
process right under the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore, did not
result in civil liability under § 1983.112 Interestingly, the Court relied on the
traditional argument that the police had discretion, even in handling
domestic violence incidents. 113 Because the Supreme Court has severely
limited the reach of § 1983 actions by eliminating the right to sue for a
failure to arrest when a restraining order has been violated, § 1983 actions
may not be an effective tool for deterring police misconduct.
Instead of suing under federal law, a plaintiff can try to sue under state
tort law. Victims of domestic violence must sue under the same negligence
theory as any other individual who seeks to bring a suit against a police
precinct because there is no domestic violence cause of action in New
105 Id (citation omitted).
106 Id. (citation omitted).
107 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194; See WEISBERG &
APPLETON, supra note 65, at 322 (explaining that in DeShaney the Supreme Court refused to find that
state social workers violated a child's substantive due process rights by failing to intervene to protect
the child from the father's abuse).
108 WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 65, at 322.
109 Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1102 (10th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 545 U.S. 748
(2005); WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 65, at 322.

110
111
112
Clause,
113

545 U.S. 748 (2005).
Id. at 754.
Id. at 768 ("We conclude, therefore, that respondent did not, for purposes of the Due Process
have a property interest in police enforcement of the restraining order against her husband.").
Id. at 760.
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York. 114 In New York, the success of a negligence suit by a domestic
violence victim against the police relies on the finding of a "special
relationship"'15 between the victim and the police. 116
A plaintiff must overcome the threshold burden of demonstrating that the
police owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. 117 To determine whether a
special relationship exists, New York uses a four-factor test including:
(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of
an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2)
knowledge on the part of the municipality's agents that inaction could
lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the
municipality's agents and the injured party; and (4) that party's
8
justifiable reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking. 1
This fourth element is rarely met in court, making it nearly impossible to
sustain a tort action in New York.119 For example, in October 2011, the
New York Court of Appeals held in Valdez v. New Yorkl1O that even
though Valdez, the plaintiff, had a telephone conversation with an officer
assigned to her case, the police did not have a special relationship with
Valdez. 121 In Valdez, after a prior order of protection expired, Valdez
obtained a second order of protection against her former boyfriend.' 22 She
delivered the order of protection and met two Domestic Violence Unit
officers assigned to her case. 123 About a week later, Valdez's boyfriend
called her and threatened to kill her.124 Valdez called one of the officers
and that officer told her that the police would arrest her boyfriend

114 See Sorichetti v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 70, 74-75 (N.Y. 1985) (requiring domestic
violence victims to establish the same special relationship exception that applies to all citizens who are
alleging police misconduct).
115 This "special relationship" differs from a § 1983 "special relationship." A § 1983 claim asks
whether a constitutional right is being deprived. A state tort action asks whether a defendant voluntary
undertook an action, and the plaintiff detrimentally relied upon this undertaking. A § 1983 action is a
higher threshold to cross, however, Valdez would not have been able to sustain a claim under either
"special relationship" doctrine.
116 Miccio, supranote 88, at 160.
117 Valdez v. City of New York, 960 N.E.2d 356, 365 (N.Y. 2011).
118 Cuffy v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 937, 940 (N.Y. 1987).
119 See, e.g., Valdez, 18 N.Y.3d at 73 (finding although an officer said the department would
handle the problem "immediately" and that the victim should return home, the victim did not
reasonably rely on this statement); Brian J. Shoot, Overruling By Implication and the Consequent
Burden Upon Bench and Bar, 75 ALB. L. REV. 841,888 (2012).
120 Valdez, 18 N.Y.3d at 84.
121 Id. at 74.
122 Id. at 72.
123 Id.
124 Id.
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immediately. 125 The next day, Valdez took the garbage out of her
apartment and was shot by her boyfriend. 126 The court of appeals
concluded that "[i]t was not reasonable for Valdez to conclude, based on
nothing more than the officer's statement that the police were going to
arrest Perez 'immediately,'
that she could relax her vigilance
indefinitely."1 27 The difficulty in establishing this special relationship
demonstrates the judiciary's effort to diminish the number of successful
suits. 128
It is nearly impossible to bring a successful § 1983 or state negligence
action. Even if a federal or state action is sustained, individual officers have
little incentive to change their behavior. 129 One reason why individual
officers have little incentive to change their behavior is because officers are
"fully insulated from the financial effects of a lawsuit."1 30 The city pays for
the attorneys in addition to any settlement or judgment against a police
precinct or officer. 13 1 In addition, there is very little pressure from external
sources, such as politicians, to regulate misconduct within the police
precinct. 132
III. ARE VICTIMS OF OFFICER DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LEFT TO FEND FOR
THEMSELVES?

Given the lack of interest in effective and preventive practices and the
absence of any legal remedies, victims of officer domestic violence are left
with very few options. What were Kristin's options? Should she have taken
the children and ran away, hoping that her police officer husband would not
find her? Should she have called the police precinct again and demanded
that the police show up at her home and arrest her husband? Should she
have hired a bodyguard to protect her twenty-four hours a day? Maybe she
should have taken matters into her own hands and engaged in a self-help
remedy. This section will focus on the option of engaging in self-help
instead of waiting for police protection.

125 Id. at 73.
126 Id
127 Id. at 81.
128 See Cufly v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 260 (1987) (explaining that courts do not want
to subject government entities including police departments to liability).
129 Patton, supranote 57, at 767-68; Irving Joyner, LitigatingPolice Misconduct Claims in North
Carolina,19 N.C. CENT. L.J. 113, 113-14 (1991).
130 Patton, supra note 57, at 772.
131 Id. at 771.
132 Id. at 772.
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A. Self-Help: Should the Domestic Violence Victim Grab the Gun First?
Reasonably fearing for their lives, victims of officer domestic violence
may be driven to take matters into their own hands by murdering their
abusers in self-defense. 133 "He said he was going to kill me, that he was
going to go down in glory," explained Barbara Sheehan, a victim of officer
domestic violence. 134 Throughout their marriage, Barbara's husband, a
former police sergeant, threatened her with a loaded semiautomatic pistol,
smashed her head against a cinder-block wall during a vacation, and threw
boiling pasta sauce at her.135 The evening before turning the gun on her
husband, Barbara told her husband that she would not accompany him on
another family trip.136 Her husband responded by punching her in the face,
giving her a bloody nose. 137 Barbara feared that if she went away with him,
38
she would never return home alive. 1
As a former police sergeant, Barbara's husband taunted her, saying that
he could murder her and then cover it up because he learned how to do so
during his police training.139 The former police sergeant would show
Barbara photographs of dead bodies and threaten that he would do the same
to her if she called the police. 140 Friends of Barbara explained the problem
of officer domestic violence by saying that Barbara "was too afraid to
report her abuse to the police since her husband had worked in law
42
enforcement."141 Simply put, Barbara's husband was the police.1
After turning the gun on her husband, Barbara was acquitted of seconddegree murder by a jury. 14 3 New York's self-defense law justifies murder

133 See, e.g., Dan Bilefsky, Murder Trial Hinges on Questions of Domestic Abuse, N.Y. TIMES
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/nyregion/barbara-sheehan-accused-of(Sept.
18,
murdering-husband-cites-abuse.html?refrdomesticviolence (finding that in 2010, Shanique Simmons, a
Bronx woman who had faced years of abuse, was acquitted on the grounds of self-defense because she
reasonably feared for her life) [hereinafter Murder Trial Hinges].
134 Dan Bilefsky, Queens Woman Testifies She Killed Her Husband in Self-Defense, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/nyregion/at-murder-trial-barbara-sheehantestifies-she-killed-her-husband-in-self-defense.html?refrdomesticviolence [hereinafter Queens Woman
Testifies].
135 Murder Trial Hinges, supra note 133.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Queens Woman Testifies, supra note 134.
141 Murder Trial Hinges, supranote 133.
142 Queens Woman Testifies, supranote 134.
143 Dan Bilefsky, Wife Who Fired 11 Shots is Acquitted of Murder, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/201 1/10/07/nyregion/barbara-sheehan-who-killed-husband-is-found-notguilty-of-murder.html?ref-domesticviolence [hereinafter Wife Who Fired].
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when there is an immediate threat to a person's life. 144 Barbara explained
to the jury that as a battered woman, she reasonably feared for her life
because of her abuser's past behavior.a 45 Barbara was convicted of gun
46
possession, which carries a sentence of three-and-a-half to fifteen years.1
Although the Queens District Attorney said that Barbara's case "was a
cautionary tale that those claiming domestic abuse should not take the law
into their own hands," 14 7 Barbara is still alive and her children still have a
mother, which may not be the case if she waited for the police to protect
her.
"On average, more than three women and one man are murdered by their
intimate partners in this country every day."' 148 The ways in which the laws
are constructed today do not benefit the victim, the community, or the
police precinct.149 If legislative action is not taken soon, a victim's best
option may be to grab the gun or pull the knife before her abuser reaches
that breaking point. By engaging in self-help, victims may be put in jail,
but they will still be alive and their children will be safe. Most importantly,
the fear, the worry, and the abuser will be buried forever.
IV. ADOPTING A NEW APPROACH BY IMPLEMENTING A DEPARTMENTAL
POLICY FOR HANDLING OFFICER DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Self-help is far from ideal from a societal perspective. Since current laws
and policies do not alleviate the problem of officer domestic violence, a
new policy should be adopted. This part calls for the New York State
legislature to adopt legislation that requires police departments to adopt a
strict policy laying out the specific procedures to be followed if an officer
is suspected of domestic violence. This legislation would be similar to the
Senate Bill adopted by the state of Washington, which mandates that police
precincts "develop a written model policy on domestic violence committed
or allegedly committed by sworn employees of agencies."' 150 Washington's

144 Id; N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15 (McKinney 2004).
145 Wife Who Fired,supra note 143.
146 Id.
147 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that Richard A. Brown, the Queens district
attorney, said that this was a "terribly sad and tragic case" and that the "children will have to pick up the
pieces.").
148 Domestic Violence Statistics, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.dvrcor.org/domestic/violence/resources/C6l/#hom (last visited Apr. 4,2014)
149 Miccio, supra note 88, at 183-84.
150 H.R.
6161,
58th
Leg.
(Wash.
2004),
available
at
http://www.lanejudson.com/docSENATEBILL_6161 .htm.
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bill focuses on the minimum standards that must be met by the policy.151
However, Washington's bill is written in general terms and does not
include penalties if the policy is not followed. 152
This part suggests that New York should use Washington's Senate Bill
as a building block and add to Washington's bill by including specific
policies that would be used as a minimum standard for police precincts
throughout the state. New York should also expand Washington's bill by
including a liability clause if the policies are not followed by a police
officer or by an entire police precinct. Section A explores what this policy
should look like and what procedures should be used to protect victims,
rehabilitate abusers, and improve the safety of the overall community.
Section B calls for the exposure of police precincts to tort liability if
officers, or an entire precinct, do not strictly adhere to this policy.
A. New York State Must Adopt an Officer Domestic Violence Policy
New York police precincts must adopt a forward-looking approach,
similar to IACP's model policy and Washington's Senate Bill, which
would address the problem of officer domestic violence. Specifically, this
policy should focus on four areas: examining applicants prior to hiring,
discovering early warning signs of abusive behaviors, dealing with
domestic violence allegations, and counseling officer domestic violence
abusers.
First, before a civilian even becomes an officer, pre-hiring screening
should be conducted. Background investigations should focus on whether
the candidate for employment has any history of domestic violence, sexual
abuse, or stalking.153 These candidates must be screened out immediately.
The next step would be to require each candidate to take a psychological
examination to determine whether any candidate has a tendency for abuse.
Initial screening would address the issue of officers who use their training
to further abuse at home. After candidates become officers, they should

151 See id. ("The model policy shall provide due process for employees and, at a minimum, meet
the following standards.").
152 See, e.g., id. ("Provide for the mandatory, immediate response to acts or allegations of domestic
violence committed or allegedly committed by a sworn employee of an agency.").
153 See, e.g., NEW JERSEY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FATALITY AND NEAR FATALITY BOARD, DEP'T OF
CHILDREN AND FAMiLIES, MODEL POLICY ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE LAW ENFORCEMENT

COMMUNITY
6
(2006),
available
at
http://www.nj.gov/dca/divisions/dow/publications/pdfs/finalmodelofdvinlecpolicy.pdf
("This
Department will conduct thorough background investigations of all potential new employees to
determine if there is a criminal history ... to acts of domestic violence, sexual abuse, stalking, elder
abuse or child abuse.").
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also be required to participate in continued domestic violence training.
Second, the entire precinct must look for early warning signs of domestic
violence abuse, instead of waiting for a victim of officer domestic violence
to muster up the courage to call the precinct. Supervisors shall document
any behavior that may be indicative of domestic violence, such as
excessive use of force on the job, inappropriate surveillance activities,
154
citizen and fellow officer complaints, and on or off-duty officer injuries.
Officers who do not report information regarding domestic violence, or
who attempt to discourage a victim from seeking help, will be subject to
criminal charges and disciplined.155 Officers must not interfere with
domestic violence cases, intimidate, or coerce witnesses or victims. 156
Third, a detailed policy regarding what happens when an accusation of
officer domestic violence is made must be clearly communicated to each
officer and each member of an officer's family. This policy should mandate
that when a call is received from a victim of officer domestic violence, an
Internal Affairs representative will be automatically sent to the scene. 157 At
the scene, the Internal Affairs representative must make it clear to the
officer that this is a criminal investigation and not just an administrative
proceeding.158 Then the officer must either be placed on administrative
work or be sent home from the job, but not to where the victim resides. 159
Prosecution should only be deferred if the abuser begins and completes
professional counseling. 160
Fourth, police departments will refer an officer accused of domestic
violence to state qualified professional counselors. The goal of this
counseling is either to ensure that the officer does not commit an act of
domestic violence again or to establish that the officer cannot be
rehabilitated. 16 1 When sending an officer to counseling for domestic
violence, the name and type of program should be specifically stated to
make sure that the officer is attending the appropriate program for his
154 See id. at 8 ( stating that supervisors shall be aware of and document any pattern of abusive
behavior "potentially indicative of domestic violence").
155 See id. at 23 ("[The department shall investigate those officers and take disciplinary action and
file criminal charges if probable cause exists.").
156 See id at 10 ("Officers who engage in [interference with cases involving themselves or fellow
officers] will be subject to severe discipline up to and including dismissal.").
157 See Bu Susan Paisner, When the Officer Is the Batterer,4 POLICE DEPARTMENT DISCIPLINARY
BULLETIN 1, 3-4 (Jan. 1996).
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 See Joanne L. Belasco, Treatment Programsin Settlement Agreements, 6 POLICE DEPARTMENT
DISCIPLINARY BULLETIN 2 (July 1998) (advising to carefully name the program that the officer should
attend).

2014]

ADDRESSING OFFICERDOMES77C VIOLENCE

problem.16 2 Since each officer will respond to the treatment differently, a
specific length of attendance should not be agreed upon beforehand. 163
Instead, a minimum number of sessions shall be established to guarantee
that the officer attends the counseling sessions for that time period. 164 A
psychological examination will determine if and when the counseling
should end. 165 To make sure that the officer is regularly attending the
counseling sessions, a representative from the program must provide
documentation stating that the officer attended and participated in the
counseling. 166
If the officer is not complying with his counseling, a noncompliance
notification should be sent immediately from the representative of the
counseling program to the Internal Affairs representative handling the
officer's case. 167 This noncompliance letter is the green light, allowing the
Internal Affairs representative to pursue the prosecution of the officer since
he is unwilling to comply with the policy. A zero-tolerance policy must be
adopted, and this policy must be clearly communicated to the entire
precinct.
This policy relies on counseling because counseling has led to a
reduction in domestic violence recidivism rates. One study of a domestic
violence program found that completing the counseling program reduced
the odds of being re-arrested for domestic violence by sixty-three percent.
168 Violations of orders of protections were also reduced by sixty-one
percent for those who completed the counseling. 169 However, the
recidivism rate for abusers who dropped out of the program was twice as
high as the recidivism rate for abusers who completed the program.170
Similarly, another study found that abusers who had attended at least
seventy-five percent of the counseling sessions were less likely to
recidivate than those who had attended fewer sessions. 17 1
162 Id. at 1.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 3 (suggesting that the officer should be psychologically evaluated to determine whether
he is fit for duty).
166 Id. at 2.
167 Id. at 3 (stating that notification of noncompliance should be written and sent quickly).
168 ILLINOIS CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, RESEARCH AT A GLANCE, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE PROGRAMS REDUCE RECIDIVISM ODDS By MORE THAN 60 PERCENT 1 (2006),

http://www.icjia.state.il.us/public/pdf/AtAGlance/BIPRAAG.pdf (publishing a study of 899 offenders
who completed a minimum of twenty-four weeks of counseling in Cook County, Illinois between
December 1, 2000 and January 24, 2004).
169 Id. at2.
170 Id.

171 Robert M. Sartin et al., Domestic Violence Treatment Response and Recidivism: A Review and

366

JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 27:2

Therefore, officer abusers must attend counseling sessions on a regular
basis to receive the full benefits of the counseling and to reduce future
domestic violence abuse. While these statistics are based on recidivism
rates for domestic violence in the general population, counseling officer
abusers adds another dimension to the motivation to want to change.
Specifically, without the counseling, the officer abusers will immediately
lose their jobs. However, it is a mystery as to whether an abuser actually
needs the heart to want to change or whether the counseling works
regardless of what the officer's real motivation is for attending the
counseling sessions.
B. What if an Officer or the PolicePrecinct Violates the Officer Domestic
Violence Policy?
If an officer or the precinct does not strictly adhere to this policy and a
tragedy descends upon a victim of officer domestic violence, a "special
relationship" will automatically be found between the victim and the police
precinct for failing to investigate and protect the victim. The police precinct
will be per se accountable, and the only way to rebut this presumption
would be to show that the police precinct followed the officer domestic
violence policy step-by-step. In other words, the burden would be on the
police precinct to present detailed documentation that the precinct complied
with all of the officer domestic violence procedures.
Placing the burden on the police, instead of on the victim, is logical
because the power party should have the burden, especially when the
victim of officer domestic violence lacks access to records and the precinct
in general. This presumption is also warranted because victims of officer
domestic violence face special challenges that victims of domestic violence
in the general population do not face. Victims of officer domestic violence
are a part of the very network of police protection that is supposed to be
protecting them, but that at the same time is abusing them. In essence, these
victims are trapped and isolated from society, having no one to turn to for
protection. For this reason, a special relationship should be found between
these victims and the police precincts. In Kristin's case, the supervisors
who affirmatively warned her about the ramifications of obtaining an order
Implicationsfor the Study of Family Violence, 11 Aggression and Violent Behavior 425, 429 (2006),
available
at
http://ac.els-cdn.com/S 1359178906000255/1-s2.0-S1 359178906000255main.pdf? tid=a02bdd72-8236-11e3-b04700000aab~27&acdnat=1 390265867 77585b28940e 1 a0635e80aca4aef54e7
(evaluating
the
effectiveness of a population of abusers who were mandated by the court to attend counseling sessions
over the course of an eight-week period).

2014]

ADDRESSING OFFICERDOMES77C VIOLENCE

of protection would have violated the officer domestic violence policy.
This communication was not a favorable message that police should be
sending to officer domestic violence victims. In doing so, the police were
protecting a fellow officer and not Kristin. The police arguably increased
the risk of harm to Kristin by instructing her that the situation was under
control, when it was not.
The goal of implementing a strict policy regarding officer domestic
violence is to eliminate officer discretion when handling allegations of
officer domestic violence. This policy would eliminate discretion in a
similar manner as mandatory arrest laws in New York, which eliminated
officer discretion when on the scene of a domestic violence incident. With
this new policy in place, officers must adhere to the policy and must not be
allowed to treat officer domestic violence victims different than other
domestic violence victims or other victims in general. This policy would
also make it easier for all members of the police precinct to do their job
without the fear of being "a rat." By adopting this policy, the prevalence of
the code of silence will be diminished because officers must perform
specific duties enumerated in this new policy or else the entire precinct will
be subject to tort liability.
To ensure that police precincts are fully accountable for their
shortcomings in dealing with officer domestic violence, victims should be
encouraged to sue the entire police precinct for the misconduct of their
officers, even if it is just one officer. 172 By suing the entire precinct, instead
of just an individual chief or officer, the inappropriate behavior cannot just
be blamed on one "bad apple" in the precinct. 173 If just one officer is sued,
the problem will not be fully addressed and institutional change will not be
required. Also, when officers are made aware that they can be personally
sued, they will be more likely to second-guess their decisions and may not
act. This inaction would only reinforce the problem of inadequate
procedures in regards to officer domestic violence incidents. 174
A balancing must take place between the loyalty to the officer and the
concern for the safety of the community. By implementing this policy, the
172 See Government Tort Liability, 111 HARv. L. REv. 2009, 2017 (1998) ("The goal of providing
compensation for victims of tortious conduct is enhanced under a system of governmental, not
individual, liability.").
173 See Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering "Custom" in Section 1983
Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 31 (2000) (describing the "bad apple theory" which explains
that municipalities are less likely to make significant changes to correct improper behavior because
municipalities can just fault that one officer).
174 See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 71-

73, 75 (1983) (explaining that public employees use inaction to avoid liability and some employees may
use a less risky kind of action).
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department will benefit by having a capable officer. 175 The officer will
benefit because his quality of life will be substantially better. 176 The
community will benefit by having another officer who is capable of
protecting them from the "bad guys."'1 77 Most importantly, the victim will
benefit by avoiding further abuse and receiving effective help.
CONCLUSION

Police officers still inadequately respond to domestic disturbances and
under-enforce the laws regarding domestic violence.1 78 When the domestic
violence abuser is an officer, this response may be even worse. Victims of
officer domestic violence face heightened risks and inadequate remedies.
To protect the victims, police precincts must adopt strict policies regarding
officer domestic violence. If these policies are not followed, the entire
police precinct will be subject to tort liability to compensate victims for a
police precinct's failure to protect and respond properly to officer domestic
violence. Legislation must be passed to encourage officers to work with
officer domestic violence victims and to prevent future harms to the victim,
the abuser, and the community. As one survivor points out, " [a]s a victim
of police abuse, the last place I would have gone to report [the abuse] was
to an advocate who worked in the same building as my husband." 179 This
fear to report must be changed through legislation.

175 See Belasco,supra note 161.
176 Id.
177 Id.

178 Miccio, supra note 88, at 157-58.
179 See Guide, supra note 38, at 21.

